H 



W 



00-3^ \ ^ 



(^ 



^i^^et^'W 



'^v i 




63d Congress 1 

2d Session J 



SENATE 



f Document 
I No. 359 



EFFECTIVE VOTING 



AN ARTICLE 

ON 

PREFERENTIAL VOTING AND 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 

BY 

C. G. HOAG 

I : 
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESEN- 
TATION LEAGUE 




,'^-3 1 ^ 1 PRESENTED BY MR. OWEN 

Janu-aky 13, 1914.— Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 
1911 



IFyoni 




a OF D. 
FFB 2B ^914 



V 






EFFECTIVE VOTING. 



PREFERENTIAL VOTING AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 



INTRODUCTION. 

Voting is the very basis of our governments, Federal, State, and 
municipal. If, therefore, the voting systems generally used through- 
out the country liitherto can be shown to be gravely defective and 
to be easily replaceable by correct systems, we have at once the 
explanation of some of the worst political evils from which we suffer 
and the key to political reform that is truly fundamental. 

PRIMARIES, PARTY NAMES, AND THE ADEQUATE BALLOT. 

The demand for primary elections is due entirely to two features of 
our final elections as usually conducted hitherto. The first of these 
features is allowing party names on the official ballots. The second 
is restrictmg the voter to the expression on the ballot of so small a 
part of his will that a preliminary election is serviceable in cutting out 
the weaker candidates of any party or group before the final election. 
If all party names and emblems were kept off the ballot, primaries 
would not be needed to determine whether, for example, a Taft or a 
Roosevelt had the better right to use the name Republican on the 
official ballot; both could be admitted to the ballot, unassociated 
with any f)arty name, and the struggle between them could be settled 
on its merits by the voters at the election itself. And if every voter 
were allowed to express his will on the ballot at the election itself 
iuWj instead of limitedly, adequately ilistead of inadequately, pri- 
maries would not be needed to cut down the number of candidates 
before the filial election. 

The only adequate ballot, of course, is what is usually called the 
''preferential" ballot, that is, the ballot that permits the voter to 
express his will so fully that it can be made effective by the countmg 
officials no matter what circumstances of groupmg may be found to 
have arisen among the voters. If, when you sent a boy to the news- 
stand for a paper, you were restricted to naming only one, you might 
have to go without any whenever the boy found, on reaching the 
stand, that the particular paper named was sold out. If, however, 
you could name several papers in the order of your preference, you 
could be almost sure of getting one, and that the one you liked best 
among those it was possible to get. The boy in this case, of course, 
takes the place of the chief election officials in the case of an election ; 
and the restriction to the naming of but one paper takes the place of 
a similar restriction on the inadec^uate ballot we have been satisfied 
with hitherto. 



I 



4 EFFECTIVE VOTHSTG. 

Such a ballot is a weak and unstable basis for democracy to rest 
upon. Consider the last (1913) State election in Massachusetts. 
Mr. Walsh, who was elected governor — 

received ^ only 183,267 votes, or less than 40 per cent of the total vote; and it may 
well have been that nearly all of the other 60 per cent preferred any one of the other 
candidates to Mr. Walsh. In three of the last four Boston city elections the same can be 
said of the successful candidate for mayor. In the autumn of 1909 a mayor of Salem, 
Mass., was elected by 24 per cent of the voters, and in the opinion of a prominent 
Salem lawyer each aiid every one of the five unsuccessful candidates was, by a strong 
majority, preferred to the wmner. The splitting of the vote which causes this injus- 
tice is frequently brought about by design. 

Another defect of the inadequate or non-preferential ballot is the discouragement 
which the prospect of a split vote offers to candidacy. A strong and good man thmks 
of mnning. A weaker man who has some follov^'ing, perhaps very small, enters the 
lists against another candidate not desired by the supporters of either of thp two first 
mentioned. Tlie strong man refuses to run unless the weaker man mentioned will 
withdraw. The latter refuses to withdraw, and thus uses the danger of splitting the 
vote as an effective ladder to self-advancement. This often occurs without reaching 
public knowledge. 

Another defect is the frequent necessity voters are under of voting, not for the can- 
didate tliev prefer but for the one who, in their judgment, is more available. In 
the next to last Boston mayoralty election many thousands who really desired to re- 
elect Mayor Hibbard did not vote for him. 

Another defect is the discouragement to voting and registering that is brought about 
through the citizen's knowledge that the man really deshed by him is not a candi- 
date, "or his belief that, though a candidate, he cannot be elected. The knowledge 
or the feeling that something is wrong with the system, combined, perhaps, with the 
other demanids upon his time, keeps him from registering or from voting. In mayor- 
alty elections in large cities the actual vote cast probably does not average more than 
70 per cent of the registered voters or 60 per cent of those qualified to register. 

It is clear, therefore, that our usual plurality system, first, may not elect the candi- 
date desired by a majority of those who vote; secondly, may discourage deskable 
candidacy; thkdly, may induce voters to express other than their real opinions; and 
fourthly, discourages many from registering and voting. 

In connection wath all our voting, then, the ballots should be ade- 
quate or preferential ballots; nominations should be made by peti- 
tion; party names and emblems should be excluded from the ballot; 
party conventions, though freely permitted, should not be officially 
supervised or recognized; and primary elections should be discon- 
tinued. 

We have now to consider — • 

THE TWO OBJECTS OF VOTING. 

There are two distinct objects to be carried out by voting. Not 
only has neitlier of these objects been carried out by the voting sys- 
tems we have generally used hitherto with even an approximation 
to correctness, but the' distmction itself has not been clearly under- 
stood. 

One of the objects to be carried out by voting is to make decisions, 
either between policies (measures) or between candidates for admin- 
istrative positions. To carry out this object what is obviously 
required by the fundamental principles of democracy is majority 
voting, thai is, a system that will range the majority of the voters 
concerned against the mmority. 

The other object to be carried out by voting is to make wp^ a lody 
jit to make decisions — subject to the operation of the initiative and 
the referendum where they are in force — on helialf of all the voters, in 

1 The quotations in this paper not othenvise credited nrc by William Iloag, Esq., of Boston, a former 
secretarj' of the American Proportional Representation League. 



EFFECTIVE V0TI:N^G. 5 

other words, to make up a deliberative or representative body. Now, 
though the principles of democracy require that the decisiojis made in 
such a body should be made by majority voting, they by no means 
require that the body itself should he made up by majority voting. 
In making up such a bodj^, indeed — as has been recognized universally, 
though until recently only very confusedly — each member's right 
to a seat should rest on his being the choice not of a majority of all 
the voters represented by the body but merely of such part of them 
as we call a "constituency." In other words, what is wanted, when 
the object in view is the maldng up of a representative body, is 
simply a condensing system. 

This distinction between the two objects of voting is the prime 
secret of fundamental electoral reform, transcending in importance 
even the adoption for all voting of the preferential or adequate ballot. 
It reveals to us in w^hat cases rational reform means replacing our 
present plurality system by a majority system without primaries 
and in what cases it means replacing our present plurality-and-primary 
system, as applied to the election of representatives by wards or 
other geographical constituencies, not by a majority-of-a-geograph- 
ical-constituency system but by a unanimous-constituency, con- 
densing, or "proportional" system. 

Plurahty-and-primary voting should be replaced by majority 
preferential voting without primaries wherever, as I have said, a 
decision is to be made. That means wherever measures are voted 
on in deliberative bodies, wherever measures are voted on directly 
at the polls, and wherever administrative officials are selected or 
removed by dehberative bodies or are elected or recalled at the 
polls. ^ 

Wherever, however, the object of an election is to make up a body 
fit to make decisions and choose admmstrative officials on behaK 
of all, our present system should be replaced, as explained in Part II, 
by a rational unanimous-constituency or condensing system, in 
which a form of adequate or preferential ballot is used but in which 
not only primaries and pluralities but even majorities have no place 
whatever. 

Part I. 

MAJORITY PREFERENTIAL VOTING (COMMONLY CALLED "PREF- 
ERENTIAL VOTING.") 

Ballots that allow the voter to express his will adequately with a 
view to reveahng how the majority is ranged against the minority 
have usuaUy been called simply "preferential ballots," and the 
systems of applying them simply "preferential voting" systems. 
Those names, however, must be somewhat restricted if they are not 
to be ambiguous, for, as has been said above, the adequate or prefer- ' 
ential ballot can and should be used not only to reveal the will of a 
majority, but to carry out the other object of voting, namely to 
elect a representative body by a process of condensation through the 
formation of unanimous constituencies. It is best, therefore, when 
we mean to refer to the adequate ballot as appUed only to revealing 
the will of the majority, to add to the words "preferential ballot" 

.1 But see passages in Part II, where it is suggested that such officials shoii.d not be elected a. the polU 
at all. 



6 EFFECTIVE VOTHsTG. 

and "preferential votino;" the word majority, so tliat the names be- 
come majority "preferential haJlot and majonty preferential voting. 

In one form or another majority preferential voting is in use for 
final elections in Queensland, Western Australia, Grand Junction, 
Colo., Spokane, Denver, Cleveland, and elsewhere, and for primary- 
elections in Wisconsin, IMinnesota, Nortli Dakota, and elsewhere. 
Unfortunately these systems are applied in the places mentioned 
not only to the election of administrative officials, wliere majority^ 
voting is desu-able, but to the election of representative bodies, where 
majority voting, as I have said and as I hope to make quite clear in 
Part II, is utterly out of place. 

We may now consider the methods by which majority preferential 
voting is carried out in these places, and that by which it ought to 
be carried out. 

THE WARE SYSTEM. 

Under tliis system, which was first proposed for actual use by 
Prof. W. R. Ware, of Harvard University, the voter is allowed to 
indicate his preferences among the candidates — as many or as few 
as he pleases — by putting the figure 1 opposite the name of his fu'st 
choice, the figure 2 opposite the name of his second choice, and so on. 

The first count is only of the first-choice votes. If no candidate has a majority, the 
lowest candidate is excluded and Ms votes only are scrutinized again and added to the 
votes of the other candidates as the preferences indicate. The candidates are thus 
successively excluded until only two are left, of whom the higher will have a majority 
vote [as between the two left], and be elected. 

This system, which in Great Britain is called the ^'alternative 
vote," is known in Western Austraha, where it is used m its com- 
plete form, and in Queensland, where it is used in truncated form, as 
the "preferential vote." That it is preferable to the "second bal- 
lot" used in Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
and other European countries, is generally conceded by those who 
compare the two. It does at a single election more than the second 
ballot system does in two, and does it better. That it is preferable 
to the primary and plurality system still common in this country, 
goes without saying. It is not, however, a perfect majority system. 
For, like the second ballot system, on which it is so obviously an im- 
provement, and hke our ovm. double election system, on which it is a 
still greater improvement, it may drop out at some stage of the 
whole process of election a candidate who is really preferred by a 
clear majority to any other candidate in the field taken singly. 

The preferential voting system used m the primary elections of 
Wisconsin and Mmnesota is the Ware system modified (1) by the 
restriction of the voter to the expression of but two preferences for 
any of&ce, (2) by provision for a first-choice and a second-choice col- 
umn, instead of the numerals 1 and 2, for the indication of prefer- 
ences, and (3) by the adaptation of the rules for countmg the votes to 
the provision that a voter may express only two preferences. This 

1 Note that I do not say hero majority voting at ihe ^olls, but simply "majority voting;" the faster wo 
move toward having all "the chief administrative ofTicials in populous communities elected, or rather se- 
lected, by majority vote of the representative body, instead of at the polls, the sooner we shall haveHhe 
highest efficiency in the admiulstration of public affairs; but, wherever the election of such ofhcials is 
carried out, it should be carried out by majority voting. .'• • 



EFFECTIVE V0TI17G. 7 

modified Ware system — the Remsen system, as it should be called — 
was devised by Daniel S. Remsen, Esq., of New York City, with 
the twofold intention of making possible the completion of the 
count without bringing all the ballots or a full transcript record of 
them together from the voting precincts, as must be done under the 
complete Ware system, and of simplifying the marking of the ballot 
by the voter himself. The elimination of the necessity of brmging 
together either ballots or a full transcript record of the preferences 
marked on each is a matter of some practical importance at the 
present time when the voters of this country generally do not 
realize their need of effective voting keenly enough to be willmg to 
go to much bother or expense to get it. That the Remsen system 
appreciably simplifies the voting itself, hov/ever, I question. Cer- 
tainly high officials in Tasmania, Western Australia, and elsewhere 
say flatly that the indication of preferences by the figures 1, 2, 
3, etc., is found to be easy by the voters of those countries. For 
example, Mr. E. J. Stenberg, chief electoral officer of ¥/'estern Aus- 
tralia, wrote on this point as follows m his official report on the 
election of 1908, the first one held there under the preferential 
system : 

Speaking generally in regard to tlie novel method of voting, it would seem that 
the fears expressed as to the likelihood of a much increased ''informal vote list" 
[i. 0., an increased number of invalid ballots] have not been borne out by experience 
(the percentage being 1.22 only), although the new system appears to have been 
better understood in some districts tlian in others. 

THE BUCKLIN SYSTEM. 

Tlic majority preferential system used in Grand Junction (Colo.), 
Spokane, Denver, Portland (Oreg.), Cleveland, and North Dakota, 
was proposed by Cgndorcet in 1793 as a system which, though 
incorrect, was the best he could think of in which the counting 
would be easy. It is said to have been used for a time in Geneva, 
Switzerland. In recent times, however, it first came into promi- 
nence on its adoption in 1909 by Grand Junction, Colo., under the 
leadership of the Hon. James W. Bucklin of that city. 

Aside from certam unessential features of this system as thus far 
actually applied in America, which are discussed below, it differs 
from the Ware only m the rules of the count. The Ware rules 
prescribe — if there is no majority of first choices — the dropping out 
of the candidate lowest on the poU and the distribution of Ms ballots 
only accordmg to the second or the next highest available preference 
marked on them, then the dropping of the next lowest candidate in 
the same way, and so on until one candidate has a majority of the 
votes behind him. The Bucklin rules, on the other hand, prescribe — ■ 
if there is no majority of first choices — the addmg together of the 
first-choice and the second-choice votes for each candidate to see 
whether any candidate has a majority, counting both; next, if no 
candidate has such a majority, it prescribes the adding together of 
the first-choice, second-choice, and third-choice votes for each can- 
didate to see whether any candidate has a majority, counting the 
three grades of votes together; and so on until some candidate has 
behmd him a majority, counting all the grades of votes thus far 
taken mto account, when that candidate is declared elected. 



\ 



8 EFFECTIVE VOTIl^G. 

THE NANSON SYSTEM. 

A majority preforential system that differs from tlie Ware and the 
Bucldm essentially only in the rules of the count was devised by 
Prof. E, J. Nanson of the University of Melbourne, Australia, and 
described b}^ him in a paper read before the Koyal Society of Victoria 
in 1882 and reprinted in the Blue Book of the British Government 
designated "Miscellaneous No. 3, 1907." Under this system a first 
choice is given more credit than a second throughout the enthe 
count, a second, more than a third, and so forth. Then, in accord- 
ance with simple rules formulated by Prof. Nanson on the basis of a 
complete mathematical solution of the problem, those candidates 
whose total credits show them to be unquestionably inferior to other 
candidates m the opinion of the voters as indicated on the ballots 
are successively dropped out as defeated untU the candidate pre- 
ferred to any other is left and declared elected. Following are com- 
plete rules suitable for ijicorporation in legislation. The notes not 
prmted in italics are not a part of the rules themselves. 

NANSON SYSTEM RULES. 

1. At the voting precincts transcribe on coordinate paper (ruled to 
correspond witli. the spacing of tlie names of the candidates on the ballot) 
the figures marlied on the ballots by the voters, rising a separate column 
for each ballot and numbering both ballot and column with a distinctive 
number in order to be able at any time to compare the original ballot 
with its record. Send the record to the central electoral board, as ordered 
by that board. 

2. On the record, but not on the ballots, let the central electoral board 
fill in all blank spaces with a figure found by dvoiding by two the sum 
of the number of candidates and a number one higher than that indi- 
cating the last preference marlied on the ballot by the voter. [See p. 14.] 
[This is merely finishing the voter's work by giving each unmarked 
candidate the average to which all unmarked candidates are entitled. 
It insures the counting of the ballot m the subsequent addition to 
the disadvantage, and to the equal disadvantage, of the unmarked 
candidates, just as the voter intended. Example: If there were 
seven candidates, the blank spaces on ballots snowing only three 

f)references would all be filled in with the number 5^; those on bal- 
ots showing four preferences, with the number 6; etc.] 

3. Add the figures of each candidate. 

4. Exclude as defeated every candidate whose total is equal to or more 
than the average. [This is reasonable because the voter used larger 
figures to represent lower preferences.] 

5. If more than two candidates remain, set down on record sheets fig- 
ures representing the preferences on all the ballots as among the candi- 
dates remaining. Add again, and again eliminate all candidates whose 
total is equal to or more than the average. 

6. Proceed again, if necessary, as prescnbed in rule 5, until only two 
candidates remain. When only two remain, examine the record to see 
which of those two was preferred to the other by the voters, and declare 
Mm elected. 



EFFECTIVE VOTING.' gT 

7. If only one candidate remains after an elimination of candidates, 
declare Tiim elected. 



Note. — The reader who wants to read only the most important parts of this- 
paper will do well to skip everything between this point and the last paragraph of 
Part I (p. 16), except the section entitled "The Condorcet Test Applied to the 
Three Sj^stems" (p. 13). 

COMPARISON OF THE THREE SYSTEMS OF COUNTING MAJORITY PREF- 
ERENTIAL BALLOTS. 

Each of tlie three systems of majority preferential voting just 
described has its enthusiastic supporters m this country, and I am 
mchned to think that for a time each of them may have a place in 
the broad and varied field of our political life; but it is unnecessary 
that any blind struggle for supremacy should arise among them, for 
there can be no question in regard to the true nature of each m the 
mmd of anybody who is willing to look at the facts and to give the 
matter a little thought. 

The Ware rules tend, just as does our present system of double 
elections, to brmg the votes of persons belonging to the same party or 
group together in support of some one candidate of that party or 
group by the sacrifice of its other candidates. If, therefore, what 
is wanted is a majority voting system that will encourage group 
solidarity, this system has much to be said for it. The ultimate cri- 
terion of the correctness of a majority system of voting, however, 
would seem to be that clearly defined by Condorcet in 1785 in a pas- 
sage translated as follows: 

There exists but one rigorous method of ascertaining the wish of a majority in an 
election. It consists in taking a vote on the respective merits of all the candidates 
compared two by two. This can be deduced from the lists upon which each elector 
has written their names in orcfer o/??ierii. * * * But this method is very long. ^ 

Judged by this test, the Ware method (as also the Bucklin) is 
defective, for it may drop out a candidate preferred by a majority of 
the voters to any other one of the ca,ndidates taken singly. The 
truth of this is proved below (p. 14) in connection with 15 actual 
ballots. It can also be seen from a still simpler example. Suppose 
that m an election to elect one person from three candidates. Smith, 
Brown, and Jones, 5,000 of the voters record first choices for Smith, 
4,000 first choices for Brown, and 3,000 first choices for Jones. Then, 
according to the Ware rules, Jones is declared out of the running, and 
his ballots distributed according to second choices. Let us suppose 
that, as set forth in the result table below, 400 of the distributed votes 
go to Smith and 2,600 of them to Bro^\m, and that Brown is therefore 
declared elected with 6,600 votes (his original 4,000 plus the 2,600 
received on the distribution of Jones's ballots). In that case the 
result is wrong if, as we may suppose for the sake of revealing the 
fallibility of the system, Jones is preferred to Brown by a sufficient 
number, say 4,000, of those whose first choice was Sinith. For in 
that case no less than 7,000 of the voters (the 3,000 who gave first 
choice to Jones plus the 4,000 who gave first to Smith and second to 
Jones) have clearly expressed on the ballots their preference of Jones, 

I Oeuvres de Condorcet, vol. XV, pp. 28, 29, edition of ISOJ.— It is precisely th3 comparison " two by 
two," said by Condorcet to be the ultimate test, though " very long," that the ingenious Nansou rul83 
accomplish quickly. 

S. Doc. 359, 63-2 2 



10 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 



the candidate dropped out by the Ware rules, to Brown. The 6,600 
votes by which in this case Brown was declared to be elected, though 
a majority, were made up, it is to be borne in mind, of 4,000 voters 
who indicated on their ballots that they preferred Brown to either 
of the other candidates and of 2, GOO voters who indicated not that 
they preferred Brov^ai to Jones, but only that they preferred Brown 
to vSmith. It is doubtless true that the probabiUties are against the 
elimination thus under the Ware rules of the candidate who, accord- 
ing to the record on the ballots, could command a clear majority of 
the votes against any other candidate taken singly; and the sj^stem 
is b}^ no means to be condemned for political uses where a perfect 
majority preferential s^'stem cannot yet be adopted; but that it is 
not infallible in giving the result demanded by the criterion of 
Condorcet must be admitted. 





First choice. 


Second choice. 


Smith 


5,000 


500 on ballots marked for Brown as first choice. 
400 on ballots marked for Jones as first choice. 


Brown 


4,000 


1,000 on ballots marked for Smith as first choice. 
2,600 on ballots marked for Jones as first choice. 


Jones 


3,000 


4,000 on ballots marked for Smith as first choice. 
3,500 on ballots marked for Brown as first choice. 



The essential principle of the Bucklin system can be understood 
from a brief analysis of the counting under this system of the same 
12.000 ballots we have just considered in connection with the Ware 
rules. Those ballots would be tabulated for the Bucklin count as 
follows: 





First choices. 


Second choices. 


Smith 


5,000 


OOO 


Brown 


4,000 


3,600 


Jones 


3,000 


7,500 



With the votes cast thus an election board canvassing the returns 
under the Bucklin rules would proceed, on finding that no candidate 
had a majority of first choices, to add firsts and seconds together. 
And on finding that both Brown and Jones had behind them a ma- 
jority, counting the votes of these two grades, the board would 
declare elected that one of them who had most, namely Jones. 

Now, what is the principle on wliich Jones is thus declared elected 
under the Bucklin rules ? In other words, what is the nature of that 
majority which the Bucklin count gets together behind the candidate 
whom it elects ? 

To answer the question in connection with our example, the m^a- 
jority of 10,500 votes that elects Jones under the Bucklin rules is 
undoubtedly composed of 10,500 different persons, the system clearly 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 11 

preventing the counting into such a total of two choices voted by any- 
one voter; but it is composed of voters of three groups, (1) those who 
gave their first choice to Jones^ (2) those who gave their first to Smith 
and their second to Jones, and (3) those who gave their first to Brown 
and their second to Jones; and these groups are united only in tl 
one respect, that they consider Jones to be one of the two test cc 
dates for the office to be filled. The principle of the Bucklin,g;^tem, 
then, is that if no candidate is considered by a majority better than 
the field, the election goes to that candidate, if any, who is consid- 
ered by a majority — or by the larger majority, in case there is more 
than one — to be one of the two hest in the field; that if no candidate is 
considered by a majority one of the two best, the election goes to 
that candidate, if any, who is considered by a majority — or by the 
largest majority if there is more than one — one of the three hest in 
the field; etc. 

This principle that underlies the Bucklm rules is not an altogether 
unreasonable one; but it is certainly not the correct one, for it 
frequently elects a candidate other than the one who should be elected 
according to the sound criterion of Condorcet. Suppose the 3,500 
voters who gave Brown their first choice and Jones their second, 
though they all greatly preferred Jones to Smith, had not recorded 
any second choice. Then the result of the second count would have 
been. Smith 5,900, Brown 7,600, Jones 7,000; and in that case Brown 
instead of Jones would have been declared elected, under the Bucklin 
rules, in spite of the fact that, according to the record on the ballots, 
7,000 of the voters (namely, the 3,000 who gave their first choice to 
Jones and the 4,000 of Smith's supporters who gave their second 
choice to Jones) clearly preferred Jones to Brown. 

It may be argued that the failure of the Bucklin rules in this case 
is due to the fact that Brown's supporters did not record on the ballots 
their real will. The reply to that is twofold. In the first jDlace, the 
Bucklin rules do not in this case elect the candidate clearly pre- 
ferred by a majority of voters, to any other in the field taken singly, 
according to the ballots as cast; and perfect rules of counting would do 
just that every time. In the second place it was nothing but the 
rules of the count that led Brown's supporters not to record their real 
will fully on the ballot; and the fact that the rules would be lilcely to 
have such an effect on the voters suggests a defect in them. This 
point, however, the effect of the rules of counting on the voters, 
should be considered not only in relation to the Buckhn system but 
also in relation to the other tv/o systems we are analyzing. 

EFFECT OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS ON THE VOTER. 

Under the Ware rules the voter knows that his second or any lower 
choice that he may mark on the ballot cannot under any circum- 
stances lessen the chances of election of a candidate whom he marks 
as higher in his scale of preferences. This is justly regarded by sup- 
porters of the Ware system as a strong argument in its favor. But 
such persons ought not to forget, as they frequently do, that although 
under the Ware rules it can never lessen the chances of the candidate 
you actually mark as first choice to mark another candidate as sec- 
ond, yet, if you can foresee that your first, choice cannot win and 



\ 



12 EFFECTIVE VOTING. 

that your second is in danger of being dropped out after the first 
count, it may seem best to you, under the Ware rules, to mark your 
first choice for the candidate who is really your second in order to 
help elect him against one or more others who will be strong rivals 
and whom you like still less. This can readil}^ be seen in the case of 
the supposed election used above in illustrating the fallibility of the 
Ware count. If it were understood that the Ware rules were to be 
used in the count, many of the 4,000 voters who gave their first 
choice to Smith and their second to Jones, if they could foresee 
that wSmith would be beaten by either Brown or Jones, would find 
it advantageous to mark Jones instead of Smith as first choice, de- 
spite their real preference of Smith to Jones, in order that Jones, not 
being dropped out after the count of first choices, should be elected 
instead of Brown. And, of course, if the chances of Smith's own 
election had been considerably less than they were in the case sup- 
posed, it might have seemed so probable that the election must lie 
between Jones and Brown that to voters of the group mentioned 
the inducements to mark Jones as first choice, though in fact he 
was not, might have been very strong. 

The possibility, under the Bucklin rules, of injuring the chances of 
your fu-st clioice by marldng a second has been mentioned above. 
It is equally true that, under the Bucklin rules, there is the possibility 
of injuring the chances of either your first choice or your second by 
marking a third. And so forth. We have now to ask why this is so. 
It is so because on the second count, which will be taken if no candi- 
date has a majority on the fii'st count (of fh'st choices), a voter's 
second choice will count equally with his first, so that in case a second 
count has to be taken, tlie effect of a voter's marJcing a second choice is 
comi)letely to neutralize his first choice so far as those two candidates are 
concerned. Likewise, of course, the effect under the Bucklin rules 
of a voter's marking a third choice, in case a third count has to be 
taken, is completely to neutralize his fost choice and his second so 
far as those three candidates are concerned. Whether, therefore, 
in an election to be carried out under tlie Bucklin rules, it is wise 
for a voter to abstain from marking a second clioice depends simply on 
whether it seems to him more important, all things considered, to 
help his second choice along with his first against all the rest or to 
help his fh'st choice against his second. This question, in turn, will 
depend (1) on vdiere the big gap in the gradation of his preferences 
comes and (2) on which candidates he thinks the election probably 
lies between. And whether or not, if it seems to him best to mark 
a second choice, it will seem best to mark a third also, and so forth, 
depends on precisely similar considerations. 

Under the Nanson rules no candidate is dropped out until it is 
mathematically certain that he is not the strongest according to 
Condorcet's test; and a lower choice is not recTconed as equal to a 
higher clioice in any contingency; from first to last il\e gradations 
of each voter's 'preferences are preserved and given effect in tlie count. 
From these facts'it might be inferred that under these rules it would 
be impossible for a voter to help a candidate Vvdiom he wanted to elect 
in any other way than by indicating his real preferences on the ballot 
as fully as possible. Yet that is not the case; though these rules, 
unlike the Ware and the Bucklin rules, are infallible in their inter- 
pretation of the ballots as actually marlced, they cannot prevent a voter 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 13 

who is able to predict which candidate will be his favorite's strongest 
rival from heli)ing his favorite against that rival by marking the latter 
as his last choice even though he may regard him as really his second. 
This possibility is the only point I have ever seen advanced as a sup- 
posed weakness of the Nanson rules. But is it really a weakness? 
I think not. It amounts simply to this, that a voter who feels sure 
that he can predict which candidate will prove to be his favorite's 
strongest rival has the privilege of takmg the risk of injuring the 
chances of that supposed rival, against others still less desirable, in 
order to avoid helping that rival's chances against the candidate of 
the voter's first choice to the extent that he would by marking the 
rival as second choice under rules providing that under no circum- 
stances can a second choice count equally with a first. And I see 
no grave objection to a voter's havmg this privilege. With the num- 
ber of candidates and the spontaneity of grouping that may be ex- 
pected after the preferential ballot is adopted for majority voting, 
voters will probably seldom be able to predict the situation accurately 
enough to care to take the risk mentioned; and the possibility that 
occasionally some voters may take it does not seem likely to have 
any harmful political effects. 

Nothing short of experience can prove to just what extent each of 
the three sorts of rules for majority preferential voting will lead 
voters to mark their ballots otherwise than according to their real 
will or to abstain from expressing their will fully. And nothing short 
of experience can prove just what harm, if any, will result from any 
such effect that may be produced from any one of the sets of rules. 
I venture, however, to express the opinion that in their effect on the 
marking of their ballots by the voters the Nanson rules will work out 
best, the Ware rules next best, and the Bucklin rules third best. In 
this ranking list our present system — the non-preferential ballot, 
etc. — would be, of course, in respect to the points considered in this 
paragraph, a very bad fourth. 

THE CONDORCET TEST APPLIED TO THE THREE SYSTEMS. 

Suppose A, B, C, D, and E are candidates for a single office that 
is to be filled by majority vote, and suppose the ballots cast in the 
election, 15 in number, are marked as indicated below, where- each 
line of figures running up and down the page represents the prefer- 
ences of one of the 15 voters as expressed on his ballot: 



A 


2 


3 


2 


2 




2 




2 


2 


1 


2 


o 


B 


3 




1 


1 


3 


4 


3 




3 


2 


1 


3 


C 




4 




4 


1 




2 


1 3 


4 


4 


4 


1 


D 


1 


2 


4 


3 


4 


3 


4 


2 1 


1 


3 


2 3 




E 




1 


3 




2 


1 


1 


4 






1 


4 



An examination of these ballots will show the reader that if conntcd according to 
the non-preferential plurality system still prevalent in this country, C or E would be 
regarded as the choice of the voters (though a new election would be necessary), the 
vote standing: 

Al, B3, C4, D3, E4. 

If the ballots were counted according to the Ware rules, candidates A, D, and E would 
be dropped one after another in that order, and C would win over B and be declared 
elected. 



\ 



14 EFFECTIVE VOTING. 

If the ballots were counted accordinc: to the Bucklin rule?, A woiild be declared 
elected; for as no candidate has a majority of first choices, firsts and seconds would 
be added together, and A would win on the two together thus; 

A 9, B4, C5, D7, E 5. 

The election of either C, E, or A, however, would be defeating the real will of the 
voters, the ballots showing clearly that 10 of the 15 voters preferred D to C, that 8 
of them preferred D to E, and that 9 of them preferred D to A. 

Following is the record of the ballots according to the Nanson system, showing how 
the true will of the voters, the election of D, is ascertained by that system: 

Record or transcript of the 15 ballots shown above. 

[The D'nire3 in italics ar? tliose supplied to the record, in accordance with No. 2 of the Nanson rules 
^iniuted on a preceding page to make the record of each ballot arithmetically complete.] 

A2322525-^221^22 ^=42 

B35113434532153 4=47 

C 44 4541521344^41 1=47^ 

D12434342113235 2=40 

E4M352114455414 4=48^ 

Divide total by number of candidates, 5)225 

Average is • 45 

B, C, and E, being above the average, are eliminated, according to No. 4 of the 
Nanson rules (p. 8). 

On examining, in accordance with No. C of the Nanson rules, the record of all the 
votes to ascertain the preference of the voters between A and D, it appears that six 
prefer A to D and nine prefer D to A. D is therefore declared elected. 

To test the accuracy of the Nanson method in this election, apply Condorcet's rule 
of a tM^o-by-two comparison. On comparmg D thus with each of the others singly, it 
is seen that he defeated — 

A 9toG, 

B 8 to 7, 

C 10 to 5, 

and E 8 to 7. 

D is, therefore, clearly entitled to win. 

Fortunately the Nanson count can give nothing but such a correct 
■result in any case, for it is simply a convenient formulation of a 
mathematical principle that covers all cases. Virtually, indeed, it 
makes the comparison of each candidate with every other one 
separately, thus rendering its verdict according to the "rigorous 
method" (see quotation from Condorcet on p. 9) Avhich everybody 
must admit to be correct. It is, therefore, the ultimate system to 
which other systems must eventually yield, for deducing from prefer- 
ential ballots the will of the majority. 

RELATIVE DIFFICULTY OF THE THREE COUNTS. 

The work of the election officials, all told, is undoubtedly greater 
under the Ware system or the Nanson than under the Bucklin. 
Under cither of the former systems, however, the only work at the 
voting precincts in addition to that required under the non-preferen- 
tial system is the numbering of each ballot and the column of the re- 
turn sheet on which its preferences are to be entered and the copying 
of those preference numbers in the column. As the record sheets 
would be ruled to correspond with the spacing of the names onthe 
ballot, so that the copying of the preference numbers in the right 
squares could be done quickly and correctly by men of average ability, 



EFFECTIVE VOTIZsTG. 



15 



tliis extra work at the precincts is not a serious obstacle to tlie adop- 
tion of either the Ware or the Nanson system. It should be noticed 
that the reading off of the figures called for by No. 5 of the Nanson 
rules can be done very rapidly if a line is drawn on the record sheets 
through the figures credited to each of the candidates being excluded. 



THE BEST FORM OF BALLOT. 



The form of ballot customary under the Ware and the Nanson 
system is this: 



A 


3 


B 


2 









D 


1 




E 






P 




G 


4 









Of course, rotation of the names (see sec. 2 of the Hare rules in 
Part II), or any other method of arranging the names on the ballot 
fairly, may be substituted for the alphabetical order indicated on the 
form above. The use of numerals to indicate preferences — first for 
D, for example, second for B, etc., as on the form above — reduces 
the chances of error in marking the ballot and makes it possible for 
the voter to indicate as many preferences as he pleases in a single 
column which can conveniently be held close to the column on the 
record sheet on which the preference numbers are to be transcribed. 

The form of ballot customary under the Bucklin system is this: 





First 
choice. 


Second 
choice. 


other 
choices. 


A 






X 




B 




X 






C. 




j 




D 


X 








E 










F 








G 




X 













The reasons for the adoption of this form of ballot were, I think, 
two: first, it made possible the designation of preferences by means 
of the X, to which our voters are accustomed; secondly, it was 
thought to be easier for the election officials to call off the different 
orders of preferences from the three separate columns than to call 
them off from different numerals in a single column. These reasons 
have some weigut; but they are greatly outweighed, in my opinion, 



\ 



16 EFFECTIVE VOTING. 

by the advantages of using in connection with the Bucklin system, 
Where that system can not be supphmted by the Nanson system 
immediately, the Imllot custom-ary under the Ware and the Nanson 
system. 

In the first pkice, the column for "other choices" undiscriminated 
from each other leads to an error in the count that is altogether 
unnecessary and not easily defensible. For inevitably, if the prefer- 
ences lower than the second are not distinguished from each other, 
the counting rules must provide, as in fact they do in most places 
where the Bucklin system is in use, that if no candidate has a majority 
of first choices or a majority counting firsts and seconds together, 
all the "other choices" to the credit of each candidate shall be added 
to his firsts and his seconds, and that the candidate who then has 
most votes of all grades together shall be declared elected. But it is 
certainly an error to add in fourth, fifth, and lower choices until it 
has been ascertained that no candidate has a majority of the voters 
behind him when only firsts, seconds, and thirds are taken into 
account. In other words the system is gravely inconsistent if it 
does not provide for a separate reckoning of the total for each candi- 
date after the admission to the count of each lower order of prefer- 
ences. 

In the second place, the ballot of the single column, for the indi- 
cation of preferences by numerals, gives the voter the opportunity of 
indicating as many preferences as he pleases without covering a wide 
sheet of paper with columns for crosses. And as we certamly ought 
to permit the voter, as soon as it is feasible to provide for it, to 
express his will on the ballot not only as exactly but as fully as he 
wants to, this is an important point. 

Finall}^, the ballot of the single column is the ballot we shall 
unquestionably want for our voting to make up representative bod- 
ies (see Part II of this paper), and it is unfortunate to have two 
forms of ballot m use v/hen one will do. It is true that under two of 
the systems of voting for representatives explained in Part II crosses 
are used mstead of figures; but that is only because under those 
systems one mark suffices. Under the Hare system, which is thought 
by the leading authorities to insure the truest results of all, the use 
of numerals for the indication of preferences is universal. 

So much for systems of voting designed to range the majority of 
the voters agauist the minority, as when a decision is to be made in 
respect to measures or in respect to officials, such as the chief admin- 
istrators, who should be satisfactory to the majority. Wlien, how- 
ever, the object of voting is not to make a decision at all, but to make 
up a body fit to make them on behalf of all the voters— in other 
words, a representative or deliberative body — then majority votmg, 
even by an infallible system, is only one degree less absurd and less 
disastrous to democracy than plurality voting itself. Indeed, the 
advantage of using the best freferential majority system instead of the 
old system {of the uncliang cable vote, the two elections, and tJie 'plnrality 
rule) where a majority vote is called for, is trifling in comparison with 
the disadvantage of using such a majority system when the object of tJie 
voting is the election of a representative body. For when that is the 
object, the principles of democracy are grossly violated if the system 
of voting does not insure that no candidate can be elected to the 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 17 

body unlesB lie is supported not merely by a majority but by approxi- 
mately the whole of a constituency, so that the process of electing the 
body as a whole shall be simply a condensation of all the voters into 
their true leaders. 

Part II. 

UNANIMOUS-CONSTITUENCY VOTING. 

C'peoportional/' or true, representation.) 

The misrepresentation of the people in their ''representative" 
bodies is unnecessary. It is due to the blunder, which will seem 
ridiculous to our children, of defining the constituency of each member 
by an arbitrary geographical line and then allowing a plurality — or 
a majority — of the voters within the designated area to elect the 
"representative." Such a method virtually disfranchises not only 
all who vote against the candidate elected, who frequently comprise 
from 40 to 60 per cent of the whole electorate, but also — to a less 
degree — those who voted for that candidate in the final election not 
because they preferred him to all others but only because they disliked 
him less than any of the others who had come through the primaries 
as officially recognized candidates. Thus oar present system makes 
it certain that most of the ballot swill be thrown away if marked for 
the voter's first choice, thereby discouraging the expression of his real 
will on the ballot, and makes it probable that a large percentage of 
the ballots will be utterly ineffective even as marked. 

How this crude single-member district or ward system works out 
in the make-up, for example, of a city council, may be tested by the 
]-eturns of any city election. I will illustrate with the figures of the 
election of 16 councilmen by wards in Columbus, Ohio, on November 
2, 1913. I take the figures of that city for no other reason than that 
I happened to be there the day after the election. In the election of 
the 16 ward councilmen the Democrats cast about 43 per cent of the 
votes, the Kepublicans about 40 per cent, the Socialists about 13 
per cent, and others about 3 per cent. Now, it is easy to see that if 
the adherents of all these parties had happened to be distributed 
quite evenly throughout the 16 wards, the Democrats would have 
elected their man in every one. If, on the other hand, the distribu- 
tion had been less favorable to the Democrats, they would have won 
fewer seats. If, for example, the Democrats had happened to be 
packed sohdly into as few wards as possible, they would have filled 
less than half of them and could not have elected more than S of the 
ward councilmen. Fmally, if the distribution of the voters had been 
as unfavorable as possible to the Democrats, the latter might not 
have elected a single one of the 16 councilmen. This is easily seen: 
if the Democrats had been distributed evenly throughout the 16 
wards, and their opponents had not, they might have been defeated 
in 12 of the wards, for example, by the Republicans and m 4 of 
them by the Socialists. Whether, therefore, the Democratic hallots 
actually cast were to elect 16 ward councilmen, or 15, or 11^., or 13, or 12, 
or 11, or 10, or 9, or 8, or 7, or 6, or 5, or If., or 3, or 2, or 1, or none 
depended— and the same thing would have heen true even if a perfect 
system of majority preferential voting had heen in use — on nohochfs 
opinion or idUI or vote, hut only on hlind chance — how the Democratic 
S. Doc. 359, G3-2 3 



18 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 



votes liappened to le distributed geogmpliicaJly th-oughout the city^ 
unless it depended on something still worse, the delilerate injustice 
known as gerrymandering. 

To get rid of this defect it is necessary only to substitute for the 
arbitrary geographical constituency of the ward system a constit- 
uency defined as enough voters anywliere in the city, unanimous in tlie 
support of a candidate, to deserve to send Mm in. In other words it is 
necessary only to define the constituency in terms of unanimity of 
win instead of in those of proximitu of home. 

The result of making this simple but extremely important change 
is commonly called "proportional representation." A name from 
some points of view better would be unanimous-constituency, or 
true, representation. 

It is easy to see that if each of the constituencies is unanimous in 
the desire to elect the candidate it does elect, and if the constit- 
uencies are approximately equal in size, the general result of the 
election must approximate the ideal of an election to make up a 
body that is to be entrusted with the power of making decisions on 
l3ehalf of all. For that ideal, as I have already suggested, is simply 
the condensation, so to speak, of the many voters into the few leaders 
fit to represent them. 

Here is an example of such condensation, the election of mem- 
bers of the Parliament of Tasmania, where the Hare system of 
proportional representation explained below is in use: 



ELECTION OF 1912. 





Votes. 


Scats 
actually 
obtained. 


Scats in 

proportion 

to votes. 


Labor 


33,634 
40,252 


14 
16 


13.66 
16.34 


Non-labor 


ELECTION OF 1913. 




Votes. 


Seats 
actually 
obtaineti. 


Seats in 

proportion 

to votes. 


Labor 


30, 896 
34,676 


14 
16 


14.14 
15.86 


Non-labor 



\ 



With such results compare those under our present crude system. 
The number of Socialist votes for Congressman in 1908, relatively to 
the number cast for Congressmen by other parties, entitled the 
party to several Members, but they gave it only one. In 1912 the 
farty, though it doubled its vote, did not elect a single Congressman. 
In the momentous general elections of January, 1910, in Great Brit^ 
ain and Ireland, where the same single-member geographical con- 
stituency is in use — 

there were 144 constituencies in which the successful member was returned by a 
majority of less than 500. Of these constituencies 69 seats were held by the Minis- 
terialists [the Liberals, Irish Nationalists, and Labor Party men] and 75 by the 
Unionists [Conservatives]. The majorities were in some cases as low as 8, 10, and 14. 
The aggregate of the majorities in the Ministerialist constituencies amounted to 
16,931, and had some 8,500 Liberals in these constituencies changed sides the Min- 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. ^19 

isterialist majority of 124 might have been annihilated. On the other hand, the 
Unionists held 75 seats by an aggregate majority of 17,389, and had fortune favored 
the Ministerialists in these constituencies their majority would have been no less 
than 274. Such is the stability of the foundation on which the House of Commons 
rests, such the method to which we trust when it is necessary to consult the nation 
on grave national issues.^ 

Many well-meaning citizens, realizing that there is something — - 
they have no clear idea what — vvTong with the single-member dis- 
trict system of representation, have proposed to elect all the mem- 
bers oi' a city's council or ''commission" at large together, and to 
allow each voter to vote for them all. Such a proposal, of course, 
means jumping from the frying pan into the fire. It means aban- 
doning the only obviously good feature of the single-member district 
or ward system — the constituency. 

The simplest unanimous-constituency or proportional Eiystem for 
electing a representative body — say a city council of nine, or the 
nine Members of Congress elected from a district comprising a quar- 
ter of the population of Pennsylvania — is arrived at by providing 
merely that the Members shall be elected at large, that no voter 
shall vote for more than one, and that the nine candidates who re- 
ceive most votes shall be elected. This is the system actually used 
for the election of the Japanese House of Representatives, Japan hav- 
ing endured only from 1889, the year of her constitution, until 1900 
the district system that still hinders political and social j^rogress in 
the United States. 

Though the constituencies that elect Members under this system 
are all unanimous, they may be very unequal in size; the candidate 
who receives most votes may receive two or three times as many as 
the weakest one of the nine elected. This possibility naturally leads 
the parties to estimate carefully how many candidates they can 
elect by dividing their strength, as nearly equally as j^ossible, among 
several; and to carry out such a program as this successfulh' it be- 
comes necessary for the ordinary voter to cast his vote for one or 
another of his party's candidates according to advice from the 
party's headquarters. In spite of these obvious drawbacks this Jap- 
anese system is far better than the single-member cUstiict system 
and should be supported for the election of representative bodies in 
cases where the obstacles in the way of the adoption of the still better 
systems now to be described are really insuperable. 

What is it that the Japanese system lacks ? Simply the adequate 
or preferential ballot that is found so useful m majority voting, the 
ballot that permits the voter to express his will as fully as he wants 
to, so that it can be carried out in the count under almost any cir- 
cumstances that may be found to have arisen. 

One of the simplest systems of unanimous-constituency representa- 
tion in which a sort of preferential ballot is used is that covered by the 
list-system provisions below. Its main features are these. Candi- 
dates are nominated — by petition, preferably — in lists. The several 
lists of candidates thus nommated are printed on the ballot under the 
headings, "List 1," "List 2," etc., no party names or emblems being- 
necessary or desirable. You vote such a ballot by marking a cross 
against one name on one list. Such a cross means that your vote is 
to count one toward determining how many representatives the sup- 
porters of that list are to elect and that it is also to help up toward 

* J. H. Humplireys: Proportional Representation, Methuen & Co., London, 1911, p. 27. 



20 



EFFECTrV^E VOTING. 



the top of that list che particular candidate marked. So if list 1, for 
example, gets about three-ninths of the total vote cast for represent- 
atives, it will be given three seats; and the particular candidates to 
receive those seats will be the thi'ee on the list who got most votes 
individually. This ballot is really a preferential ballot, you see, 
though scarcely ever called by that name; for though the voter marks 
only one candidate, he thereby expresses also the desire to give his 
vote, if it cannot help the candidate marked, to such other candidate 
on the same list as it can help. 

A LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

Nomlnaiion and election provisions. 

Revised Januarj', 1914. 

Section 1. Nominal ion of candidates for Representatives in Congress from each district 
shall be hy petition, signed by electors, who have signed no other petition to nominate ariy 

candidate for Representative at the same election, to the nnmbcr of ^ The petitions 

shall include the domicile addresses of the candidates. Each such petition may nominate 
as many persons, not nominated by any other petition, as there arc seats to be filled from 
the district; but it may nominate as few persons as the petitioners wish. Each petition 
shall be signed, filed, and verified in the manner prescribed by law, shall contain the signed 
consent of each candidate, and shall be filed with the election authorities at least twenty 
days prior to the election. 

Sec. 2. The several lists of candidates — all the persons, ivhether one or more, nomi- 
nated by one group of petitioners being considered one list — shall appear on the ballots, 
without party names or emblems, in an order determined by lot by the eledion authorities. 
The names and domicile addresses of the candidates on each list shall be printed on the 
ballot in the alphabetical order of the surnames. 

Sec. 3. 'The form of the ballot shall be substantially as shown below. 

[Form of ballot.] 



FOR llEPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS. 

DiRECTioxs TO Voters: 

Mark a cross (x) opposite the namo of one candidate only for whom you want to vote. (If the 
candidate you vote for is found to be elected without your vote, or if he is found to have too few votes 
to be elected with it, your vote will be counted for some otlier candidate on the same list.) 

Do not mark more than one name. If you spoil this ballot, tear it across once, return it to the elec- 
tion officer in charge of the ballots, and get another from him. 



List 1. 



List 2. 



List 3. 





[Domicile address] 




B ! 









p 








s 




T 


V 




Y 





[Domicile address] 
c 




G 




H 




J 




K 





[Domicile address] 
D 






it II 
L 






11 u 

M .. 






N 






Q 






II 







"•• The squares for the voter's cross would bo at the right of the names, of course, in States in which custom 
would require such a change. 

' See the footnote on p. 20 in connection with nominations under the Hare system of proportional 
representation. The suggestion made there is equally applicable to the list system, though, of course, 
the minimum of votes required should be, under a list system, a minimum for a list instead of a mini- 
mum for a particular candidate, and the number of the minimum should be about a third of the number 
of votes by which each member will probably bs elected. 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 21 

Sec. 4. The total number of valid ballots for Representative in Congress cast in the 
district shall be divided by the number of Representatives to be elected from the distriet, 
and the quotient shall be the "quota." 

Sec. 5. The total number of full quotas contained in the total number' of valid ballots 
cast in the district for the candidates of a list shall be the number of candidates on said list 
to be declared, elected on the first assignment of seats. 

Sec. 6. After this first assignment of seats, the remaining seats, if any, shall be assigned 
asfolloivs: The number of valid ballots for the condidates of each list shall be divided by 
the numberr of seats, plus one, already assigned to such list, and to the list showing the largest 
quotient shall be assigned one additional seat. This procedure shall be repeated until the 
number of seats assigned shall be that to which the district is entitled.'^ 

Sec._ 7. The candidates to be declared elected from any list shall be those individually 
receiving the largest number of votes. 

Sec. S. A ballot marled for names on more than one list shall be set aside as invalid. 
A ballot marled for more than one name on one list, but not for names on more than one 
list, shall be counted as a vote for the list but shall not be counted in determining the 
standing on that list of particular candidates. 

Sec. 9. To any vacancy that shall occiir, otherwise than by the operation of the recall, 

in the delegation of Representatives in Congress from a district, the [here name 

the proper election authorities] shall appoint, to fill out the unexpired term, that candi- 
date from the list on vhich the vacating Representative ivas nominated ivho, of all the un- 
elected candidates on that list, received most votes. [Here add provisions for filling the 
vacancy in case the provision in this section fails .] 

Three modification of tliese provisions sliould be mentioned. 
The first is adduig a square for the voter's cross in connection with 
the title of each list, thus : 

n Listl. n List 2. n Lists. 

This addition is permissible. If it is made, the ''Directions to voters " 
should be changed to read thus: 

Mark a cross (X) opposite the title of one of the lists of candidates. 
Mark also, if you have any preference among the candidates on the 
list you mark, the name of one candidate only on tliat list. 

A hallot is spoiled on wliicli two lists are marlced, or on wJiicJi a list and 
a candidate not on it are lotJi marJced. If you spoil, etc. If this addi- 
tion is made to the list system provisions above, the wording of those 
provisions should, of course, be changed slightly to conform to the 
form of ballot used. A ballot marked for one individual candidate 
but not separately for any list's title should be regarded as valid and 
as exactly equivalent to a ballot on which the title of the candidate's 
list is also marked. 

The second modification that should be mentioned is the substitu- 
tion of party names for the titles, "List 1," "List 2," etc. Though I 
do not personally favor this modification, there is nothing m the 
system of election itself to prevent making it. If it is made, however, 
the simple provisions for nominatmg candidates covered by section 1 
must be supplanted by far more elaborate provisions, such as legally 
regulated primaries, to guard against the giving of a party name to a 
list of candidates that has not a good right to it. 

The third modification is changing section 6 to read thus: After 
this first assigmnent of seats, the remaining seats, if any, sliall he as- 
signed to the lists shoioing the largest remainders of i>otes after the first 
assignment. This provision is at least as fair as the other, and simpler. 
The provision in the text of the rules, which is essentially the same as 
that used in Belgium, favors the lists that receive most votes. There 

1 The reasons for these provisions are explained on p. 22 in eonneetion with a concrete illustration. 
The provisions are essentially the same as those governing the assignment of seats to lists in the system of 
proportional representation used for parUamontary elections in Belgium. See the aliernalive form of this 
section explained ielow as the " third modification " to be considered. 



22 EFFECTIVE YOTIXG. 

is doubtless somotliing to be said for favoring the largest parties or 
groups thus, but there is also much to be said — in my personal opinion 
more — for the simpler rule, which is as favorable to small parties as 
to large ones. 

Consider how these rules would work out in a concrete case. Sup- 
pose the eastern district of Pennsylvania, which is to elect 9 of the 
36 Members of the House of Representatives elected by the State, 
polls valid votes as follows: 

List 1. 

Candidate A 40, 000 

Candidate B 60, 000 

(\\ndidate O 4, 000 

Candidate P 52, 000 

Candidate S 1, 200 

Candidate T 40 

Candidate V 30, 000 

Candidate Y 10, 200 

197, 440 
List 2. 

Candidate C ] 0, 000 

Candidate G 4, 000 

Candidate H 6, 900 

Candidate J 40, 220 

Candidate K 24, 002 

85, 122 
List 3. 

Candidate D 20, 000 

Candidate L 10, 000 

Candidate M 22, 004 

Candidate N 40, 850 

< 'andidate Q .' GO, 408 

Candidate U 2, 208 

T55, 470 

The ballots being marked as shown b}'^ these figures, the total vote 
of the district would be 438,032. Tito quota would be that number 
divided by 9, which is 4S,670|. 

As that last number is fully contained in the vote of the fh'st list 
four times, that list is given four seats on the fh'st assignment. The 
four candidates on the lii-st list to receive these seats are (1) Candi- 
date B, (2) Candidate P, (3) Candidate A, and (4) Candidate V. 

As the quota is fully contained once in the vote of the second list, 
that list is given one seat on the first assignment, the candidate 
receiving it being Candidate J. 

As the quota is fully contained three times in the vote of the third 
list, that list is given three seats on the first assignment, the candi- 
dates receiving them being Candidates Q, N, and M. 

Applying now the rule of section 6 above, we fuid that dividing 
197,440 by 5 gives us 39,488; dividing 85,122 by 2 gives 'us 42,561; 
and dividing 155,470 by 4 gives us 38,867^-. We therefore assign tlie 
ninth seat to the second list, the candidate receiving it being Candi- 
date K. Applying the alterative form of section 6 suggested above, 
we assign the ninth seat to the second list because it shows the largest 
remainder after the subtraction of full Cjuotas for the seats already 
assigned. In this case the two rules woiUd give the same result, but 
in many cases they would not. 

The second of these two rules for the filling of seats not filled by the 
fu'st assignment explains itself. The fh"st of them may seem merely 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 23 

arbitrary. In fact, however, the first rule, though not, in my personal 
opinion, so fair as the second one, is based on a principle. The prin- 
ciple is that each seat remaining unassigned after the fu'st assign- 
ment on full quotas shall be assigned to the list which, if it is assigned 
the additional seat in question, will have behind eacli of its members 
the largest part of a full quota. 

Compare the errors of this election with those of an election of 
Representatives under our present single-member district system. 
Under the latter the error involved in the election of a Member often 
amounts, as we have seen, to from 40 to 60 per cent of all the voters 
of a constituency, and it would often amount to nearly 50 per cent of 
them even if a majority preferential system were substituted for our 
usual system of pluralities and primaries. In the election we have 
examined, on the other hand, the error, in the case of the election of 
each Member, is only the difference between the number of votes 
that elect him and a full quota. In the case of candidates B, P, A, 
and V, for example, the error is the difference between 49,360 (the 
number of times that 4 goes into 197,440) and 48,670|- , which is the 
full quota. In the case of candidates J and K the error is the differ- 
ence between 42,561 (the number of times that 2 goes into 85,122) and 
48,670f , the full quota. In the case of candidates Q, N, and M the 
error is the difference between 51,823J (the number of times that 3 
goes into 155,470) and 48,670f, the full quota. 

It should be noticed that every Member elected by this system is 
elected by a constituency that may fairly be called unanimous. Take 
the case of candidate V. It is true, of course, that many of the 42,561 
votes by which candidate V is elected were cast by voters who pre- 
ferred one of the other candidates, B, P, O, S, T, or Y, Yet every 
one of those voters indicated, by marldng candidates in the first list 
after reading the "Directions to voters" at the top of the ballot, that 
he wanted to help elect some other candidate in that list if his vote 
could not be effective- for the particular candidate he marked. It 
may be objected that the list itself did not 'precisely suit every one of 
the voters who decided to vote for some candidate on it. That is 
true, but it must at least have suited nearly every politically intellig-ent 
voter who supported it, for otherwise the unsatisfied w^ould liave 
taken advantage of the opportunity, easily afforded them by section 
1 of the election provisions, to nominate one or more other lists. 
Within the limits of the flexibility of so simple a list system, therefore, 
the constituency electing candidate V — and the same may be said of 
any of the eight others elected — may be said to be unanimous. 

The proportional system set forth above provides, therefore, a 
means by which at a single election the voters of a large district can 
form almost perfectly unanimous constituencies, each one of which 
contains approximately the same number of voters that there would 
be m an entire single-member district under our present system. 
Under such a system, therefore, the delegation of nine Members of Con- 
gress from the eastern district of Pennsylvania would represent the 
voters of that part of the State almost perfectly; and as the same would 
be true also of the three other large districts of the State and of all the 
enlarged districts of the other States, the House of Representatives as 
a whole would represent almost perfectly the voters of the Nation. 

With various modifications, the list system of unanimous-constit- 
uency or proportional representation is in use for the election of the 



24 EFFECTIVE VOTIXG. 

Parliaments of Belgium, Sweden, and Finland, for that of the comicils 
of about haK the Cantons or States of Switzerland, and for that of 
town councils in Sweden, Switzerland, and elsewhere. Its adoption 
for parliamentary elections in France has already been voted by the 
Chamber of Deputies more than once, and it is expected to pass the 
Senate in the near future. President Poincare and ex-Premier 
Briand are among the supporters of the reform. 

Besides the list system, two other systems of unanimous-constitu- 
ency or proportional representation deserve special attention in this 
country at the present time. 

One of these, which is sometimes called the '^ single transferable 
vote" but is best called, from the name of its chief originator, the Hare 
system, is in use for the election of the Parliament of Tasmania, the 
municipal councils of Denmark, t'tie Upper House of Denmark, and 
the Parliament of the Union of South Africa.^ The same system has 
been incorporated in the "Home rule" bill for the election of all 
members of the Senate and 31 members of the House proposed for 
Ireland. I say the "same system" though the details of the provi- 
sions by which proportional representation is to be carried out in 
Ireland are to be prescribed, according to the bill, by the "King in 
Council." There is no doubt, since the Hare system is the only one 
strongly supported in the United Kingdom, that the "King in Coun- 
cil" will not think of prescribing any other. The clause of the bill 
prescribing proportional representation for the Senate passed the 
House of Commons on (3ctober 31, 1912, unanimously; that pre- 
scribing the system for tlie House of Ireland passed the same body 
on January 7, 1913, by a vote of 311 to 81. These votes were the 
natural result of the agitation that has been carried on in Great 
Britain for many years under the leadership of such men as John 
Stuart Mill, Lord Courtney of Penwith, Lord Avebury (better known 
to Americans as Sir Johii Lubbock), Earl Grey (recently Governor- 
General of Canada), and Mr. John H. HumphrxBys. 

The Hare system differs from the hst system in that the names of 
candidates, instead of being nominated and arranged on the ballot in 
lists, are nominated singly and are arranged on the ballot in alpha- 
betical order (with or without rotation of names) or in any other 
order considered fair. It differs from the list system also in that the 
voter, instead of markmg one candidate on one list with the under- 
standing that if his vote cannot help elect the particular candidate 
marked it will help some other on the same list, indicates his own 
personal preferences — as many or as few as he pleases — by the 
figures 1, 2, 3, etc. Finally, of course, it differs from the list system 
in the rules of the count, which must be adapted to the form of 
ballot used. The dominating principle of the Hare rules is that each 
ballot is to be counted for the voter's highest preference (as indicated 
by the figures on the ballot) wdioni imder the circumstances it can help. 

' The advantage of the Hare system over the list is that it gives the 
individual voter the opportunity of having his vote count only in 
accordance with his own personal preferences, v/hereas the list system 
requires him to help a ready-made list when he helps one candidate 
on it. The disadvantages of the Hare system, as compared with the 

1 In llic case of the Upper House of Denmark and the Senate of South Africa the system is applied not to 
the voting at the polls but to that of the electoral colleges by which the two bodies mentioned are elected. 
In Tasmania and in the municipal elections of Denmark the system is applied to popular elections. 



EFFECTIVE VOTIISTG. 25 

list system or with the schedule system soon to be explained, are 
(1) that it practically requires the bringing together for the comple- 
tion of the count of all the ballots cast for the election of the several 
representatives in question; (2) that the count is harder to explain 
and longer to carry out, and (3) that, unless the rules of the count are 
elaborated a good deal, small elements of chance remain involved 
in them which, though of trifling practical importance, are per- 
ceptible to critics and are sure to rouse opposition on the part both 
of those who seek some flaw to peck at and of those wdio, not under- 
standing the system thoroughly, honestly think the elements of 
chance in its count seriously objectionable. 

Hare ballot rules suitable for certain uses in this country, notably 
for the election of city councils under the admirable city manager 
plan of government, are printed below. It will be noticed that 
section 1 1 is given in alternative form. "Alternative Form A '' means 
less work for the counters at the central bureau, but the retention 
in the count of an element of chance that can be eliminated. "Alter- 
native Form B" eliminates this element of chance absolutely; it 
does it by the simple device adopted by the mother who, having three 
equally beloved children and three very unequal apples, cut the big 
apple, the middle-sized apple, and the mean little apple each into 
three pieces and gave to each of the children one piece of each apple. 
It may be asked why, since such a mathematically perfect device 
can be adopted to get rid of the chance in Form A, that alterna- 
tive of the rule is offered at all. The reason is that Form A is enough 
simpler than the other to make a difference in respect to the adoption 
of the system in some cases, and the objections to it are not really 
serious. Ask yourself whether the voters whose ballots are left, under 
Form A, to elect their fh'st choice are treated fairly. Then ask your- 
self whether those whose ballots are taken, under Form A, each to 
help elect the next preference marked on it who can be helped by it, 
are treated fairly. And no other voters are concerned. It is 
possible, of course, that distributing one group of a thousand 
ballots instead of another might make a difference between the 
election of one candidate and the election of another; but even if it 
did so, the group of members elected would in any case be truly 
representative of the voters who elected them, and there would be no 
more unfairness involved than there is in certain other features of an 
electoral system, for example the choice of Tuesday rather than Wed- 
nesday as election day. 

BABE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

Nomination and election provisions. 

[Phrased suitably for a State law covering an optional cTiarter plan for the municipalities of the State.] 

Revised January, 1914. 
Section 1 . Nominations of candidates for the council shall be by petition, signed by elect' 
ors (-who have signed no other petition to nominate a candidate for the council at the same 
election) to the number, in municipalities of not more than ten thousand inhabitants, of 
three per cent of the number of electors who voted at the last preceding regular municipal 
election; to the number, in municipalities of more than ten thousand but not more than 
twenty-five thousand inhabitants, of two per cent of the number of electors w'ho voted at 
the last preceding regular municipal election; and to the number, in municipalities of more 
than twenty-five thousand inhabitants, of one and a half per cent of the number of electors 
who voted at the last preceding regular municipal election: Provided, however, That in 
no case shall the number required be more than two hundred. 



2G 



EFFECTI\T<: TOTING. 



Each such petition shall be signed, filed, and verified in the manner prescribed by 
law, shall contain the signed consent of the candidate, and shall be filed with the election 
authorities at least thirty days prior to the election} 

Sec. 2. The ballots used in all elections provided for in this act shall be vnthout party 
marks or designations. The naines of candidates on such ballots shall be printed in 
rotation,'^ as follows: 

The ballots shall be printed in as many series as there are candidates for the council. 
The whole number of ballots to be printed shall be divided by the number of scries, and the 
quotient so obtained shall be the number of ballots in each series. 

In printing the first series of ballots the names of candidates for the council shcdl be 
arranged in alphabetical order. After printing the first series, the first name in the list of 
candidates shall be placed last in such list and the next series printed, and the process shall 
be so repeated until each name in the list of candidates shall have been printed first an equal 
number of times. The ballots so printed shall then be combined in tablets, so as to have 
the fewest possible ballots having the same order of names printed thereon together in the same 
tablet. The ballots shall in all other respects conform as nearly as may be to the ballots 
prescribed by the general election laws of the State. 

The form of the ballot shall be as follows: 

[Form of ballot.] 3 



FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE COUNCIL. 

DraECTiONS TO voters: Put the figure 1 opposite tlie name 
of your first choice for the council. If you want to express also 
second, thud, and other preferences, do so by putting the fig- 
ure 2 opposite the name of^your second choice, the figure 3 oppo- 
site the name of your third'choice, and so on. You may express 
thus a.s many preferences as you please. This ballot will not 
be counted "for your second choice unless it is found that it 
cannot help yom- first; it will not be counted for your third 
choice unless it is found that it cannot help either your first 
or your second; etc. The more choices you express, the more 
likely you are to make your ballot count for one of the candi- 
dates you favor. 

A ballot is spoiled if the figure 1 is ■put opposite more than one 
name. 

If you spoil this ballot, tear it across once, return it to the elec- 
tion officer in charge of the ballots, and get another from him. 

Candidates foe tue Council. 




[Name.] [Domicile address.] 
A 




B 









D 




E 




F 




G 




n 




I 




J 




K 




Iv 







1 These conditions for nominating candidates may be modified, if it is thought best, by reducing some- 
what the number of signatures required and requiring the deposit in connection with each nomination of a 
small amount of money, to be returned to the depositor if the nominee in question receives m the election a 
reasonable number, say about a quarter of a quota, of first-choice votes and votes transferred from surpluses 
put together. . , , , „ 

2 Of course these provisions for rotation of the names on the ballots are not an essential part of the plan. 
If rotation is not desii-ed, put the words "alphabetical order" instead of the word "rotation" hero and 
omit the passage that follows as far as the words " The ballots shaU in all other respects." 

3 Of course the squares for the voter's marks should be at the right of the names instead of at the left 
in States where custom would requiie such a change. 



EFFECTIVE yOTIN"G. 27 

Sec. S. The numerals thus marked on the ballot shall be understood to mean that the 
voter tvishes his vote to be effective in the election of his highest preference possible under the 
fules, a candidate tuhose name is ^narked with a smaller number being always preferred to 
one whose name is Tnarked with a larger number and the latter to one ivhose name is not 
marked at all, and that he desires his ballot, in case it appears on any count that it is not 
needed by, or cannot under the rules be effective in the election of, that candidate for ivhom 
it has been or ivould be counted, to be transferred to another candidate in accordance tvith 
his preferences marked thereon. 

Sec. 4- The ballots shall first be sorted and counted at the several voting precincts accord- 
ing to the first choices of the voters. The valid ballots so cast for each candidate shall be 
sorted into tivo groups, that of valid ballots on which the voter's second choice is clearly 
indicated and that of valid ballots on ivhich his second choice is not clearly indicated. Each 
such group shall be tied up by itself and properly marked on the outside, and the two for each 
candidate shall then be tied up in one bundle which shall also be properly marked on the 
outside. All the bundles thus viade up at a precinct, together with the invalid ballots and 
a record of all the ballots cast at the precinct, shoioing the number of invalid ballots, the 
number of valid ballots, the total number of first-choice ballots for each candidate, and the 
number of ballots in each of the tivo groups of first-choice ballots received by each candidate, 
shall be forwarded to the hoard of deputy State supervisors of elections or the hoard of 
deputy State supervisors and inspectors of_ elections,^ as directed by that board, and the 
counting of the ballots shall proceed under its direction. 

Sec. 5. First-choice votes for each candidate shall be added and tabulated as the first counts 

Sec. 6. The whole number of valid ballots shall then be divided by a number greater by one 
than the number of seats to be filled. The next whole number larger than the quotient thus 
obtained shall be the quota or constituency." 

Sec. 7. All candidates the nuviher of whose votes on the first count is equal to or greater 
than the quota shall then be declared elected. 

Sec. 8. All votes obtained by any candidate in excess of the quota shall be termed the 
surplus of that candidate. 

Sec. 9. The surpluses shall be transferred, successively in order of size from the largest to 
the smallest, each ballot of the surplus being transferred to and added to the votes of that 
continuing candidate for v)hom a preference is indicated on it. [If section 11 is adopted 
in Foi-m B, change the last clause of section 9 to read thus: the votes of the surplus 
being transferred to and added to the votes of continuing candidates, according to the highest 
available preferences indicated on the ballots capable of transfer, as prescribed in section 11.1 

Sec. 10. "Ballots capable of transfer" means ballots from tvhich the preference of the 
voter for some continuing candidate can he clearly ascertained. '' Continuing candidates" 
means candidates who have not been declared elected or defeated. 

Sec. 11. Alternative Form A. The particular ballots to be taken for transfer as the sur- 
plus of any candidate shall be those that come to hand indiscriminately, xvithout selection. 
from such, of his ballots as are capable of transfer, and the order in ivhich those ballots 
shall severally be transferred shall be that in which they happen to come, without selection. 
All the ballots not so transferred as surplus shall he set aside as effective in the election of 
such candidate. 

Alternative Form B. In transferring the surplus of any candidate, all the ballots capable 
of transfer that were cast for him as first choice shall he transferred, each ballot being reckoned 
for this purpose, however, only as such fractional part of a vote as is required to make the 
total number of whole votes transferred that number — except as reduced by the disregard 
of fractions presaibed in this section belotc — which was available for transfer. In crediting 
votes thus transferred from the surplus of any candidate to any other candidate vjho may 
receive them, fractional parts of a vote shall not he counted.^ 

1 In some States the proper oflieials would have some other title. The alternative title given would be 
suitable for Oliio. 

2 To see that section 6 accords with common sense one has only to consider that in any whole number of 
votes there caimot be more than one group larger than half of the whole number, or more than two groups 
each larger than a third of the whole number, or more than nine groups each lai'ger than a teuth of the 
whole number, etc. 

3 Kxample: Suppose the quota is 10,001 votes, and Candidate A gets 20,027 first-choice votes, of which 
19,980 are capable of transfer. Then, since Candidate A needs 10,001 votes to make up his own quota, he 
needs, in addition to the 47 ballots cast for him that were not capable of transfer, 9,954 of the 19,980 votes 
represented by the 19,980 ballots capable of transfer. Therefore only 10,026 voles are available for transfer 
to other candidates, and in the transferring of the 19,980 ballots each of those ballots must be reckoned as 
only \y%l% of a whole vote. So when it is found that Candidate M, for example, receives 500 of the 19,980 
transferred ballots, he ought to be credited with only 250 Ullo votes, for that is If^iS of 500. And as the 
rule provides for the neglect of fractions in crediting votes, Candidate M is credited with 250 votes simply. 

The use of such fractions has to be resorted to, of course, oaly for a single multiplication in connection with 
each of the candidates who receives a batch of ballots on the transfer of a surplus. As this part of the count- 
ing is all carried out at the central bureau, and the arithmetical calculations involved are few and simple, 
the apparent complexity of the transfer of surplus votes according to Form B of Section 11 should not be 
considered a serious objection to the adoption of the rule in that form. The transferring of votes thus 
oflfers no difficulties in practice, according to the highest official evidence from Tasmania. (See testi- 
mony of John M'Call, Agent-General of Tasmania, before the British Royal Commission in 1909— British 
Blue Book " Cd. 6352," 1910, especiaUy ^3029.) 



28 EFFECTIVE VOTIXG. 

Sec. 12. After the transfer of all surpluses, the votes standing to the credit of each can- 
didate shall be counted and tabulated as the second count. 

Sec. 1.3. After the tabulation of the second count (or after that of the first count if no can- 
didate received a surplus on the first) the candidate lowest on the poll as it then stands shall 
be declared defeated and all his ballots capable of transfer shall be transferred to the contin- 
uing candidates, each ballot being transferred to the credit of that continuing candidate 
preferred by the voter. After the transfer of these ballots afresh count and tabulation shall be 
made. In this manner candidates shall be successively declared defeated, and their ballots 
capable of transfer transferred to continuing candidates, and a fresh count and tabulation 
made. After any tabulation the candidate to be declared defeated shall be the one then 
lowest on the poll. 

Sec. 14. Whenever in the transfer of a surplus or of the ballots of a defeated candidate 
the votes of any candidate shall equal the quota, he shall immediately be declared elected 
and no further transfer to him shall be made. 

Sec. 15. When candidates to the number of the scats to be filled have been declared elected, 
all other candidates shall be declared defeated and the count sIiqU be at an end: and ivhen 
the number of continuing candidates shall be reduced to the number of seats to be filled, those 
candidates shall be declared elected and the count shall be at an end; and in this case the 
ballots of the last candidate defeated need not be transferred. 

Sec. 16. If at any count two or more candidates at the bottom of the poll have the same 
number of votes, that candidate shall first be declared defeated who was lowest at the next 
preceding count at tcMch their votes were different. Should it happen that the votes of 
these candidates are equcd to each other on all counts, they shall be declared defeated succes- 
sively fro7n the younger to the older. ^ 

Sec. 17. No ballot shall be counted in such a way as to make it effective in the election 
of more than one candidate. 

Sec. 18. On each tabulation a count shall be kept of those ballots which have not been 
used in the election of some candidate and which arc not capable of transfer, under the desig- 
nation ''Nontransferable ballots." 

Sec. 19. On each tabulation a count shall be kept of the invalid ballots; but no ballot 
shall be declared invalid except one on which the first choice of the voter cannot be clearly 
ascertained. A ballot marked with a cross opposite one name but with no other mark shall 
he treated exactly as if it had been marked with the figure 1 opposite the same name but with 
no other mark. 

'- Sec. 20. Every ballot that is transferred from one candidate to another shall be stamped 
or marked so that its entire course from candidate to candidate throughout the count can be 
conveniently traced. In case a recount of the ballots is made, every ballot shall be made 
to take in the recount the same course that it took in the first count unless there is dis- 
covered a mistake that requires its taking a different course, in which case such mistake 
shall be corrected and any changes made in the course taken by ballots that may be required 
as a result of such correction. The particular ballots the course of which is to be changed 
in the recount as a result of such corrections shall be taken as they happen to come, without 
selection. 

Sec. 21. So far as may be consistent ivith good order and with convenience in the counting 
and transferring of the ballots, the public, representatives of the press, and especially the 
candidates themselves shall be afforded every facility for being present and witnessing 
these operations. 

The third of the three systems of inianimoiis-constitiiency voting 
for the make-up of rejjresentative bodies tliat seems to me to de- 
serve special attention in this country at the present time is the Gove 
or schedule system, which was devised independently by William H. 
Gove, Esc{., of Salem, Mass., and Archibald E. Dobbs, Esq., of Ireland. 

Under this plan the candidates' names arc printed on the ballot in a 
singie column, as imder the Hare. But under this plan each candidate 
really stands for a whole list, the distinguishing feature of the plan 
being that every ballot that cannot help elect the candidate for 
whom it was cast — either because he has enough without it or because 
he is hopelessly out of the running even with it— is to be counted to 
help one of the other candidates in accordance v/ith a list or schedule 
of preferences handed in to the electoral officials by the candidate 
himself and duly published several days before the election. 

1 For the last 12 words of section 16 may be substituted thefollowing, if they arc preferred: "lolsshall 
be drawn to decide which candidate shall next be declared defeated. " The words in the text of thcrulea 
are iu accordance with a reasonable practice embodied in the legislation of some countries. 



EFFECTIVE VOTHsTG. 29 

Among the differences between the schedule plan and the hst 
plan are these: 

(1) The former lends itself to the Australian form of baUofc, whereas 
the latter lends itself to the party-hst form of ballot. 

(2) The former offers the voter many lists, a different one for 
each candidate, without making the ballot physically cumbersome, 
whereas the latter either restricts the voter to his choice among a 
few lists or makes the ballot cumbersome. Neither plan, of course, 
makes the ballot "long" m the political sense of that word; for, 
politically, a ballot is "long" that is hard to vote so as to make the 
voter's will efi'ective, and a ballot is "short" that is easy to vote so 
as to produce that result; and it is very easy for the voter to vote 
so as to make his will — or what, at least, closely approximates to his 
precise will (see remarks on the Hare plan just below) — effective 
Tv^ith either a schedule-plan or a list-plan ballot. 

(3) The schedule plan allows a candidate's name to be on more 
than one Hst, whereas the list plan does not. 

The significant differences between the schedule plan and the Hare 
can be stated briefly. The schedule plan, Hke the hst, does not offer 
the voter the same opportunity that the Hare does to make his vote 
count only in accordance with his own personal hst of preferences. 
Since any'limitation whatever of the voter's power to make his ballot 
count exactly in accordance with his own will is at least a slight 
vitiation of democracy at the fountain head, this is a matter of some 
importance. The schedule plan, however, like the list again, is far 
simpler to exj^lain than the Hare, does not require the bringing 
together of the ballots from the precincts for the completion of the 
count, and adapts itself to our custom of voting simply by maldnjg 
a cross against one name. For many uses, notably where the terri- 
torial area of the election is very wide, as in the case of the election 
of State legislators. Congressmen, or presidential electors, these 
practical advantages of the schedule and the hst plan are miportant. 

The principal provisions that should be included in ar bill providing 
the schedule plan for the election of a representative body are: 

1. Nomination by petition (if not provided for by existing laws), 
with domicile address of each nominee and with or without provi- 
sions for a denosit as explained in a footnote above in connection with 
section 1 of tlie Hare rules. 

2. Permission — it should not be a requirement — for each nominee 
to file within a specified time the names, arranged in an order of 
preference, of one or more of the other nominees to whom votes cast 
as first-choice votes for himself are to be transferred in case they can 
not help him because, according to the rules of the count, he has 
enough to be elected v/ithout them or so few as to be out of the 
running with them. 

Requirement that no such Hst is vahd unless accompanied by the 
signed assent, on the part of each nominee whose name appears in it, 
to the presence of his name on the list in the position in which it 
stands. 

3. Specifications in regard to the publication of the lists before the 
election. 

4. Specifications in regard to the quota or constituency that en- 
titles a candidate to election, like those of section 6 of the Hare pro- 
visions in this paper. 



30 EFFECTIVE VOTING. 

5. Rules in regard to the distribution of the surphises (of votes 
received directly by any candidates), one after another in order of size, 
to the other nominees, according to the preferential list, if an}^, 
handed in by the nominee furnishing the surplus. 

6. Provisions similar to those of sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, and 21 of the Hare rules. 

One modification of this system, afl'octing sections 2 and 5, deserves 
mention. If it is thought best, the requhcmont that the names on a 
list shall bo in a definite order of preference (see section 2) may be 
omitted, m which case the order m which the candidates on a list 
shall be preferred m the transfer of votes (see section 5), shall be 
that of their strength as indicated by the number of votes received 
by them directly. This modification is thought by some propor- 
tionalists to be an improvement. Though it gives the voter less 
definite knowledge than the other provision does m regard to how 
his vote will be transferred in case it cannot be used to help the can- 
didate of his first choice, it has some advantages that will suggest 
themselves readily to every reader. 

TO WHAT ELECTIONS SHOULD PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS BE APPLIED? 

Some proportional or unanimous-constituency system should be 
applied to the election of every body whose chief function is to 
deliberate and to make important decisions or appointments on 
beliah of those who elect it. This includes city councils under the 
Federal plan and the city manager — sometimes called the commission- 
manager — plan of government. It does not include the commission 
under the Des Moines plan, because under that plan the adminis- 
trative functions of the commissioners are more important than their 
representative functions. It includes both chambers of our State 
legislatures so long as two chambers are elected at all. As soon, 
however, as one chamber is made truly representative of the entire 
body of voters of the State, the second chamber will doubtless be done 
away with. It includes the House of Representatives of the United 
States. It includes the National Electoral College. It includes the 
standing committees of our representative bodies. It includes boards 
of education and other such public boards until the powers of such 
boards are given over to the truly representative legislatures and 
city councils and their purely administrative duties are given over to 
professional administrators. It includes representative committees 
of clubs, college and sthool classes, and private organizations gen- 
erally. 

Where in these cases the difficulties of explaming the system and 
countmg the ballots are not insurmountable obstacles, the Hare system 
is to be preferred to the list or the schedule. There is no reason why 
the Hare should not be used for many purposes, including the election 
of some of our city councils. Wherever, however, it seems necessary 
to have recourse to a system easier to explam and providing an easier 
count, the list or the schedule is to be recoimnended mth confidence 
that either of them will work admirably and give us a representative 
body that really represents. For the election of Members of Congress 
and members of the Electoral College the list system, the simplest of 
all to explain and to introduce, seems especially suitable. In con- 
nection with the Electoral College it may be added that if the list 
system explamed in this f>aper, without party names or emUems on tlie 



EFFECTIVE VOTI]SrG.. 31 

hallof, were adopted for the election of the group of presidential elec- 
tors assigned to each of the States, not only would the division of the 
college between the several parties be much fairer than it has been 
hitherto, but the need of a vast primarj^ system to decide what candi- 
date has the right to be called the candidate of any party would be 
wholly obviated. It is to be hoped, therefore, that it may be possible 
to get such a system for the election of presidential electors adopted 
in the States generally before we undertake ihQ big task of putting in 
operation a direct prunary system — which the greater and more easily 
introduced reform proposed would make superfluous — for the nomi- 
nation of party candidates for the Presidency. 

TRUE REPRESENTATION AND EFFICIENCY. 

A pomt of the greatest importance in connection with the intro- 
duction of a unanimous-constituency system of representation, which 
will simply condense the voters into a body made up of the true 
leaders of all shades of opinion and interest, is that it opens the way 
for taking all the chief administrative offices off the ballot altogether, 
and for filling them by majority preferential vote ^ of the representa- 
tive body itself. Provide that such administrative officials shall hold 
office indefinitely during the pleasure of the representative body, 
that each representative shall affirm, as a condition of taking his seat, 
that in voting for the selection or the retention of such an official he 
will be guided only by considerations of fitness for the work after 
thorough investigation, and you have the most democratic method 
yet discovered for havmg the purely administrative work of govern- 
ment done efficiently. 

Though the brilliant work of the National Short Ballot Organiza- 
tion has brought this principle to our attention recently under a new 
name, there is really nothing new in the principle itself. The efficient 
chief administrator of an English city, the city clerk, is selected by the 
council to serve indeffiiitely during its pleasure. The efficient chief 
administrators of Prussian cities, the biirgermeisters, are selected and 
retained in office in the same way. And there is nothing undemocratic 
about it; that is democratic which gives actual effect to the people's 
will — not that which pretends to, but doesn't. The people's real 
will is to have their business done economically and well ; and as they 
know that they are not in a position to select administrators at the 
polls so well as their representatives can select them by giving the 
matter thorough-going attention, they greatly prefer, as soon as their 
eyes are opened to perceive the mockery of democracy now known 
as the "long ballot," to let their representatives select these officials, 
and then to hold the representatives strictly accountable for the 
trust. Now the unanimous-constituency system of representation, 
by insuring the election of a representative body fit to make selec- 
tions, between men as well as between measures, on behalf of all — 
subject, I should personally hope, to the operation of the initiative, 
referendum, and recall (the last named as explained below)--— opens 
the way for the attainment of efficiency without the sacrifice of a 
jot or a tittle of democracy. 

1 For majority preferential voting in a representative body no otlier system than the Nanson need be 
considered. 



32 EFFECTIVE VOTIXG, 

TROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND THE RECALL. 

Hitherto the recall has been applied only to officials elected by a 
plurality or majority system. For officials elected thus the method of 
applying the recall hitherto in use is ])crfectly reasonable. For a 
representative elected under a proportional or unanimous-constitu- 
ency system, however, the method of applying the recall should be 
quite different. A representative elected under such a system holds 
his seat by virtue of the unanimous support of a body of voters 
immerous enough to have a right to fill one of the seats regardless of 
the possible opposition of every other voter in the district. To pro- 
vide, therefore, that a representative holding his seat on such a basis 
could be ousted from it at any time by a mere majority of the voters 
of the district would be absurd. But the way out of the difficulty is 
simple: provide that when a sufficient number of voters of the district 
demand it — a multi-membered district, of course, as that is the sine 
quanonoi proportional representation — ji recall election shall be held, 
under the proportional rules governing regular elections, for all the 
representatives of the district. The result of such an election will be 
that every member for the district who still has a '"quota" or con- 
stituency behind him will get liis seat again, and any member Avho 
does not will lose his seat. 

One other point in this connection should he covered. There is no 
need of providing that officials holding office at the pleasure of the 
representative body shall be subject to the recall at all. Why? 
Because if it is time to recall such an official it is time to hold recall 
elections covering the entire membership of the representative body 
itself, for that body should be held absolutely responsible for an 
official whom it has the power to replace at pleasure. 

These are the principles that should govern the relations between 
proportional representation and the recall. In actual practice, 
however, it will l)e found that the use of the recall in connection with 
representative bodies elected hj good systems of proportional repre- 
sentation will scarcely ever be resorted to. 

CONCLUSION. 

To sum up a few of the points covered by this article, there is no 
place at all, in a plan of government suited to modern conditions, for 
either primary elections or plurality voting. "V^Tien tJie object of the 
voting is to make a selection among more than two candidates for 
one non-representative office or to make a decision among more 
than two measures or policies, the voting should be done by one of 
the majority preferential systems ex])lained in the first part of this 
article, preferably by tlie Nanson system where the counting of the 
ballots by that system would not be seriously inconvenient. When 
the object of the voting is to make uj) a selection-making or decision- 
making body— that is, a deliberative, representative, legislative, pohcy- 
determining body — the voting should be done by a unanimous-con- 
stituency or proportional system, such as the Hare, the list, or the 
schedule. In majority preferential voting the voter should be allowed 
to express his will on the ballot as full ij as lie pleases; and the will of 
the majority should be interpreted, as soon as it is feasible to sup- 
plant the systems already in use, b}^ the infallible system of Nanson. 



EFFECTIVE VOTING. 33 

In unanimous-constituency votins^ the voter sliould be allowed to 
express his full will not only as fully as he pleases but as exactly as is 
feasible; in other words the Hare system should be preferred to the 
list or the schedule except where simplicity of counting is required. 
The marking of majority ballots should in all cases be by the figures 
1, 2, 3, etc.; that of unanimous-constituency ballots by the same 
method under the Hare system, by a simple cross under the hst or 
the schedule system. A representative body elected by a system 
insuring true representation should be given the power to select and 
to retain in office indefinitely during its pleasure chief administrative 
officials of professional experience and attainments. 

Finally, to add one point, as bodies supposed to be representative 
are made truly representative and the selection and retention of the 
chief administrators is given into their hands, so that the majority 
voting called for in the selection or retention of such officials is trans- 
ferred from the polls to the representative chamber, majority voting 
will gradually disappear from elections at the polls and the majority 
voting done in the representative chamber will be by the Nanson 
system. 

Effective voting, the leading principles of v/hich as applied to 
American conditions have been explained in this paper, is the indis- 
pensable basis of the mechanism of democracy demanded by the needs 
of the present and the coming age. 

C. G. HOAG, 

Secretary of the American Pro])ortional Representation League. 
Haverford, Pa. 

o 



J^. 



LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 



011 931 579 7 ^ 



